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The notion of core political values has long been of central importance in understanding how citizens 
evaluate policies, parties and candidates. However, the characterisation of these higher order values as, 
if not immutable then highly stable, has meant little attention has been paid to the causes and 
consequences of shorter term fluctuations. This paper demonstrates that switching allegiance between 
main parties led to significant shifts in the left-right political value dimension amongst the British 
public during the early 1990s. I use a True Intra-individual Change (TIC) structural equation model 
(Steyer, Eid and Schwenkmezger 1997; Steyer, Partchev and Shanahan 2000; Steyer and Krambeer 
2003) on data from the British Election Panel Survey to examine the influence of party allegiance and 
changes in party allegiance, on change in the left-right political values of individual voters between 
1992 and 1997. Results indicate that switching allegiance from the Conservative to the Labour party 
between 1992 and 1994 resulted in significant and enduring shifts in left-right values in the direction 
of the party of defection. Some change was observed between 1992 and 1996 for those defecting from the 
Conservatives to the Liberal Democrats, though this group had returned to their 1992 positions by the 
time they were re-surveyed in 1997. Those who stuck with the Conservative Party between 1992 and 
1994 had moved significantly to the right by 1996, a position they retained up to the General Election 
in 1997. No change was observed amongst stable Labour and Liberal Democrat voters. While the 
absolute magnitudes of these value shifts were not large, the fact that left-right position has itself such 
an over-riding influence on party popularity, means that even small shifts in this value dimension can 
have sizeable impacts on the popularity ratings and vote share of the main parties.  
 
                                                 
1 The support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged.  The work arises 
from the ESRC Research Methods Programme and the Modeling Attitude Stability and Change (MASC) project. 
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Politicians and parties routinely seek to mobilise electoral support through appeals to shared 
values amongst key constituencies. New Labour’s contentious  ditching of Clause 4 of its 
constitution in 1995, to take a recent example, was portrayed by its critics as a departure from 
Labour’s traditional redistributive values, while its proponents argued that it was merely an 
updating of these same values to make them relevant in 21st Century Britain. The Major 
government’s protracted slide into electoral unpopularity was, during the same period, 
strongly associated with an attempt to reassert traditional Conservative ‘family values’. 
Appeals to such deeply held, core values and beliefs have been broadly interpreted as 
strategic attempts by parties to mobilise core supporters while attracting as many new voters 
as possible. That is to say, voter preferences on these dimensions are assumed fixed, with 
parties positioning themselves so as to maximise popular support (Downs 1957; Dunleavy 
and Ward 1981). 
Appealing to core political values as an electoral strategy would, moreover, seem 
sensible from a close reading of the extant literature on voting behaviour. Political scientists 
have consistently invoked the notion of core values as a fundamental explanatory variable in 
models of vote choice and as a means of saving the mass public from charges of political 
ignorance (Converse 1964; Rokeach 1973; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Feldman 1988; Bartle 
1998). A key, perhaps definitional, criterion of core values, from this perspective, has been 
their long-term stability and resistance to change (Kinder and Sears 1985). To talk of labile 
and ephemeral core values is in many ways oxymoronic. This focus on stability and 
resistance, however, has meant that the role of core values in explaining medium and short-
term electoral volatility has consequently been underemphasized in electoral research. Where 
core values have been deployed as explanatory mechanisms in patterns of party popularity, 
the primary focus of empirical research has been on inter-generational replacement. Political 
preferences may shift through core value change but only as older cohorts die and are 
replaced by younger ones with different value constellations (Inglehart 1990).  
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In the remainder of this paper I provide some background on theoretical and 
empirical work on the ontological status of core values, before outlining some of the reasons 
why we might expect parties to shape as well as react to preferences on these dimensions in 
the short to medium term. In the empirical section of the paper I use micro-level panel data to 
examine how stability and change in party allegiance in Britain during the early 1990s 
impacted subsequently on the locations of individual voters on the left-right political value 
dimension. By using data with a longitudinal element and examining inter-individual 
differences in intra-individual change, a more powerful case for a causal link is provided than 
that produced by cross-sectional analyses or conventional longitudinal regression models. 
Using a True Intra-individual Change (TIC) Structural Equation Model, I also provide 
estimates from the same model of how short-term changes in this core value impact on the 
subsequent popularity ratings of the main parties. I conclude by discussing the implications 
of these results for our understanding of the electoral significance of core political values. 
 
FORMATION AND CHANGE OF CORE VALUES 
Values are standardly conceived of as being deeper, more enduring and causally antecedent 
to more proximal political preferences such as issue and candidate evaluations (Katz 1960; 
Allport 1961; Converse 1964; Rokeach 1973). They are the building blocks upon which less 
resistant psychological constructs, such as attitudes and opinions are formed and maintained. 
For, being essentially evaluative tendencies (Zaller 1991; Zaller 1992; Eagly and Chaiken 1993), 
attitudes require dimensions of judgement against which objects may be compared and 
ranked in terms of some preference function. Values are, therefore, the ‘glue’ that bind 
together the apparently disparate elements of a political belief system (Converse 1964), 
forming a common evaluative base for judgements over the likelihood that particular 
candidates, parties and policies will support and affirm the deeply held values of a particular 
social and political epoch (Lipset 1959). As Zaller puts it “Every opinion is a marriage of 
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information and values – information to generate a mental picture of what is at stake and values to 
make a judgement about it” (Zaller 1991 p.215) . 
 There is some debate as to the number and ontological status of core political values 
in modern liberal democracies such as Britain and the United States and the extent to which 
different nation states weight and prioritise somewhat different constellations (Lipset 1959; 
Rokeach 1973; McClosky and Zaller 1984). Rokeach’s seminal study of individual and social 
value orientations detailed 18 conceptually distinct core values (Rokeach 1973; 1979), while 
Feldman (1988) and Kinder (1998) suggest that the core values of the American public can be 
accounted for by just three basic dimensions; ‘individualism’; ‘egalitarianism’; and ‘limited 
government’. In Britain, a similarly parsimonious, ‘libertarian/authoritarian’ 
‘socialist/laissez-faire’  two dimensional model has gained empirical support in work by 
Heath and colleagues (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985; Heath et al. 1991; Heath, Evans and 
Martin 1993; Evans and Heath 1995).  
Yet, while there is no clear consensus as to the exact number and nature of core 
political values, most investigators are in general agreement about their genesis and trajectory 
through the life course. In seeking to understand the mechanisms underlying value formation 
and change, most emphasis has been placed on socialisation processes during adolescence 
and early adulthood (Campbell et al. 1960; Butler and Stokes 1969; Rokeach 1973; Inglehart 
1990). In a world in which ‘rationally ignorant’ citizens maintain only a limited grasp of 
matters politic, values are not so much learned as instilled. We gain our conception of ‘the 
good society’, osmotically, through the interaction of personality with a network of familial 
bonds, work place associations and ties with key socio-political institutions. Inglehart’s well 
known account of materialist and post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990; 
Inglehart 1997), for example, sees adult values as largely determined by the extent to which 
their early years were characterised by a relative need to fulfil each of Maslow’s hierarchy of 
human needs (Maslow 1954).  
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CORE VALUES AS ENDOGENOUS TO POLITICAL CONTEXT 
However, while the predominant social scientific characterisation of core values has 
been of powerful and highly stable evaluative tendencies developed early in the life course, 
there is reason to believe that parties do not merely react to fixed voter preferences on these 
dimensions but seek to shape them to their own electoral advantage. If core values are as 
important determinants of vote choice as many writers have suggested, this is an eminently 
sensible strategy, for even small aggregate shifts in the desired direction would reap large 
electoral rewards. Downs himself, realised that the restriction of fixed voter preferences in 
spatial models of party competition was a necessary but unrealistic simplifying assumption:  
 
“Though parties will move ideologically to adjust the [ideological] distribution under some 
circumstances, they will also attempt to move voters towards their own location, thus altering it” 
 
(Downs 1957 p. 140)  
 
Dunleavy and Ward (Dunleavy and Ward 1981; Dunleavy 1991) have delineated 
some of the ways in which parties can seek to shape voter preferences, concentrating their 
analysis on medium to long term strategies aimed at altering the social structural composition 
of the electorate, or the relations between groups within existing social relations. Incumbent 
parties can, for instance, increase the proportion of voters with favourable attitudes to free-
market economics by instigating policies which increase share and home ownership 
(Dunleavy 1980b; Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985). Alternatively, left leaning parties may seek 
to mould preferences in the opposite direction by increasing workforce sizes in state-run 
bureaucracies, the employees of which have a vested interest in maintaining more regulatory 
and interventionist forms of government (Dunleavy 1980a; Dunleavy and Ward 1981). Extant 
empirical research has, however, provided only mixed support for the existence and 
effectiveness of such strategies (Stauberger 2003). 
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 But parties need not be limited to such indirect, ‘sociological’ strategies for shaping 
voter preferences. As Heath et al point out, we fall prey to “naïve social determinism” if we 
overlook the fact that parties might put together a coherent and persuasive policy platform, 
which not only attracts votes but serves to shape and mould the core values of the public 
toward their particular programmatic agenda: 
 
“Public attitudes can be shaped by political leadership as well as by social change. The political parties 
can perhaps help to define what counts as class ideology. Parties are not the prisoners of social change 
and social structure; they are probably one of the major agencies which help to shape subjective 
awareness of class interests and to translate these into class values”. 
 
(Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985 p. 134) 
 
Heath and colleagues present evidence in support of this more communicative form 
of preference shaping between 1964 and 1983 in Britain but this is rather indirect, based as it 
is, on the observation that value change over this short a period could not readily be 
accounted for by social structural change. More direct evidence comes from a study by 
McCann (1997) who showed that declaring support for a particular candidate in the 1992 U.S. 
Presidential race between George Bush and Bill Clinton was associated with change in 
‘egalitarianism’ and ‘moral traditionalism’ between 1990 and 1992. McCann concludes that 
his analysis, 
 
“boldly challenges the assumption that values and beliefs are fully exogenous to participation and 
remain constant throughout an election. The portrait painted here is of an electorate that relies on fairly 
stable core principles when making choices, but reassesses these principles during political 
involvement” 
(McCann 1997 p.580) 
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In this paper I build on this pioneering work by examining a different political 
context, over a longer time period and with a different type of statistical model, well suited to 
the task. Before turning to a presentation of empirical results, however, I briefly review 
below, some of the theoretical and conceptual bases for expecting short to medium term 
volatility in party support to impact on the core values of individual voters. 
 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON VALUE CHANGE 
The idea of cognitive consistency has long been of central importance in understanding belief 
system structure. Heider’s (Heider 1944; 1946) Balance Theory proposes the need for 
cognitive consistency as a basic motivational drive, paving the way for later theories such as 
Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger 1957), Self-Perception Theory (Bem 1965; 1972) and 
Associative Networks (Anderson 1981; 1983) all of which, implicitly at least, rest on the 
notion of consistency as a central tenet of human interaction and psychology. That individual 
elements within broader cognitive structures are in some way consistent with one another 
also has a strong intuitive rationale: we expect ‘consistency’ in the expressed views and 
actions of others and are keen to portray our own outlook as comprising a coherent and 
integrated whole (Aronson 1968; Tedeschi and Rosenfeld 1981).  
Such theories have clear implications for understanding how changes in party 
support might impact on the core values of individual voters. As parties articulate their 
policy agendas with a particular set of value positions, voters switching parties should soon 
become aware of any disparity between their existing values and those of their currently 
supported party. This will be particularly evident during election campaigns when such 
appeals attain their greatest media prominence (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Guadet 1948; 
Kinder and Sears 1985). Processes of self-perception and dissonance reduction should then 
serve to move such individuals in the ideological direction of the party of defection. From this 
perspective, party allegiance is seen as a predominantly internal driver of value change, which 
follows rather than precipitates vote choice. 
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Party support is also inextricably linked with notions of identity (Campbell et al. 
1960; Butler and Stokes 1969; Price 1989). The Michigan tradition of electoral research, in 
particular, sees political affiliation as a fundamental aspect of social identity developed 
during adolescence and early adulthood, with the party acting as a sort of ideological 
orientation mechanism through which new information can be weighed up and evaluated: 
 
“Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what 
is favourable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process 
of selection and perceptual distortion will be” 
 
(Campbell et al. 1960 p. 133) 
 
And although the notion of Party Identity has mostly been associated with explaining 
stability rather than change in voter preferences, as key parts of our social identities, changing 
party allegiance should be expected to have a considerable impact on core values and beliefs. 
For, as individuals change their party of support and begin to integrate this into their lattice 
of existing social group memberships, they will come to apprehend the archetypal or 
‘referent’ characteristics of the group and gradually ‘impute’ this into their own cognitive and 
behavioural makeup (Turner et al. 1987; Turner 1991). As with the effects of cognitive 
consistency mechanisms, the internal drivers of attitude change from the social identity 
perspective are as consequences as opposed to drivers of stability and change in party 
allegiance. Likewise, we should expect these identity based mechanisms to be at their most 
powerful during election campaigns, when political issues attain their greatest prominence in 
the media and political campaigning and debate is routinely portrayed as group conflict 
(Price 1989). 
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DATA 
The data that form the basis of this study come from the 1992-1997 British Election Panel 
Study (BEPS). The 1992-97 BEPS is a multi-stage, stratified, face-to-face probability survey of 
the British electorate, the first wave of which was conducted shortly after the 1992 General 
Election. Respondents to this cross-sectional survey were then followed up, each year, until 
1997, with the final wave falling shortly after the subsequent general election when the whole 
process began anew with a fresh sample (see Brook and Taylor 1996 for full technical details). 
The first wave of the study was conducted in April 1992, with a response rate of 73%, 
representing a total sample size of 3534. Respondents were then followed up each year until 
1997 using a combination of face-to-face, telephone and postal methods. The analytical focus 
for this study comprises those individuals who were interviewed in 1992, 1994, 1996 and 
1997, which due to attrition reduced the analytical sample to 1640 respondents. Previous 
investigations of the attrition on this survey indicate that the sample remained representative 
of the GB population (Brook and Taylor 1996; Taylor, Heath and Lynn 1996). 
 
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT  
In order to empirically evaluate the impact of changes in party support on the ideological 
positioning of voters, it would appear sensible to select a political context in which significant 
numbers of voters did change their party of support. It was for this reason that the 1992-1997 
British Election Panel Study was chosen as the data for this analysis. The period 1992-1997 
witnessed a sharp decline in support for the Conservative party and the ensuing rise in 
popularity of the Labour party, initially under John Smith and subsequently Tony Blair and 
the New Labour ‘project’. Polling and academic survey evidence suggests that majority 
support for the Conservative party had remained relatively stable at approximately 40% from 
1990 through to the 1992 General Election2. Following the 1992 election victory and the 
subsequent debacle of Britain’s departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 
                                                 
2Although see Jowell et al (1993) for a description of how the non-probability sampling methods of the pollsters 
almost certainly led to a systematic underestimate of Conservative support in early months of 1992. 
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support for the Conservative government began to haemorrhage in early summer of that 
year. By the beginning of 1993 poll evidence showed that support for the Conservative party 
had slipped to approximately 30%, with the Labour party on around 45% of the popular vote, 
a position which remained largely unaltered up to and including the 1997 General Election 
(see Norris and Evans (1999) for detailed analysis of trends in party support over this period). 
This would seem, then, to offer a particularly suitable context in which to situate this analysis. 
 
MODELING 
The primary research hypotheses investigated in this analysis are: 
 
H1 Switching party allegiance between 1992 and 1994 led to change in ‘left-right’ core 
values in the direction of the party of defection, net of other factors. 
 
H2 Change in ‘left-right’ core values between 1992 and 1996 led to change in assessments 
of party favourability in 1997, net of other factors. 
 
The type of model used to test these hypotheses is a True Intra-individual Change (TIC) 
Structural Equation Model (Steyer, Eid and Schwenkmezger 1997; Steyer, Partchev and 
Shanahan 2000; Steyer and Krambeer 2003). Such models are related to the general family of 
latent growth curve models (McArdle and Nesselroade 1994) and provide estimates of inter-
individual differences in intra-individual change in concepts measured with a correction for 
measurement error. The basic idea behind the TIC model is to express change in the same 
construct over repeated measurements as a latent variable, which can then be used 
simultaneously as both an exogenous and an endogenous variable in full structural models to 
investigate the causes and consequences of change. At each time point the concept of interest 
is measured by an observable indicator, with some degree of error: 
 
 10
‘Causes and Consequences of Core Value Change’ Sturgis APSA Philadelphia 2003 
Y1 = τ 1 +  ε 1         (1) 
 
 
Where Y1 denotes the observed score,τ 1 denotes the true score and ε 1 is an error term. A 
second measurement can be denoted by changing the suffixes in equation (1) to 2: 
 
Y2 = τ 2 +  ε 2         (2) 
 
The true score term in equation (2) can also be expressed as a function of the true score at time 
1 and the difference between true score at time 2 and the true score at time 1: 
 
τ 2 = τ 1 +  (τ 2 - τ 1)        (3) 
 
The observed score at time 2 can therefore be expressed as a function of the true score at time 
1, the difference in true scores between occasions and an error term: 
 
Y2 = τ 1 +  (τ 2 - τ 1) +  ε 2        (4) 
 
Equation 4 can be expressed as a simple path diagram thus: 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Path Diagrammatic Representation of a TIC Model 
 
Y1 
Y2 
ε 1 τ 1 
τ 2 - τε 2
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The model, as specified in equation (4) and Figure 1 is, however, unidentified. That is to say, 
unique estimates cannot be found for the unknown parameters in the model because the 
number of parameters to be estimated outnumber those that are known. In order to obtain an 
over-identified TIC model, it is necessary to extend the number of observed indicators at each 
point of measurement. If we impose the restriction of uncorrelated error terms, this can be 
achieved with a minimum of two indicators at each measurement occasion. This restriction is 
only necessary to obtain an over-identified model and need not apply if there are sufficient 
indicators and waves of measurement. The TIC model can be extended to accommodate an 
unlimited number of measurement occasions by using general subscripts i and k  to denote 
change for the ith individual at the kth point of measurement: 
 
 
Yik = τ 1 +  (τ k - τ 1) +  ε ik       (4) 
 
Because this model provides estimates of change relative to the first point of measurement, 
this specification is referred to as the baseline TIC model. TIC models can also be specified 
such that change is relative to the previous (as opposed to the first) point of measurement, the 
so-called Neighbour model. I do not provide further details of this latter form of model here 
but see Steyer et al (1997) for a detailed discussion. 
TIC models have many benefits relative to other approaches to analysing individual 
change. In contrast to cross-sectional multivariate methods, the incorporation of a time 
element with repeated measurements on the same individuals gives far greater leverage on 
the direction and flow of causal mechanisms. Additionally, the analysis of dependencies in 
lagged estimates of change  in key constructs yields a stronger causal argument than that of 
covariances between levels. That is to say, we should have greater confidence that two 
constructs are causally related if it can be shown that micro level change in construct A at 
time point 1 is followed by change in construct B at time point 2 than if we show that an 
individual’s position on construct A at time point 1 is associated with their position on 
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construct B at time point 2. This is because the former schematic model fits better with 
commonly held assumptions regarding the nature of causality (Holland 1986; Pearl 2000) and 
can, in some instances, override concerns regarding unmeasured variables, which is generally 
the most serious threat to valid causal inferences (Freeman 1984; Duncan 2000). 
 The use of multiple indicators for the purpose of model identification, also allows 
correction for measurement error in the estimation of change in the concept(s) of interest, 
yielding a True Score variable in the sense of Classical Test Theory (Lord and Novick 1968). 
This brings all the standard advantages of True Score variables (see Bollen 1989; Joreskog 
1993) which may be considered all the more important when the variable in question is one of 
change as opposed to level. This is because the ratio of signal to noise is generally lower in 
measures of change than in measures of level for, in most cases, correlations between true 
scores are higher than those between error scores on the same variable over time (Duncan 
2000).  
A further benefit of the use of multiple indicators is that longitudinal measurement 
invariance may be evaluated. The problem, generally stated, is that questions may change 
their meaning over time, rendering estimates of stability and change inferentially 
problematic. In the context of political attitudes and values, Heath et al (Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice 1985) describe the problem when analysing a time series question from the British 
Election Studies which, between 1964 and 1983, asked respondents to evaluate whether more 
industries should be nationalised. Because the extent of nationalisation changed quite 
markedly over the period in question, changes in marginal distributions are difficult to 
interpret, “the electorate may not have changed its mind at all about the preferred extent of 
public ownership; it may simply be reacting in a perfectly consistent way to the institutional 
changes” (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985 p. 132). While it is clearly not possible to impose 
invariant meaning on survey questions through any statistical procedure, it is possible to 
impose such a constraint and then test its reasonableness through standard measures of  
model fit. The TIC model used in this analysis imposes the constraint that the unstandardised 
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factor loading between each observed variable and the latent construct it measures remains 
constant over time. The empirical reasonableness of this constraint is then evaluated through 
comparisons of standard measures of model fit between this model and one with no such 
constraints imposed (Meredith 1993). 
Missing data rates on the items used in this analysis were generally low (less than 1% 
of all responses), though on some of the control variables as many as 8% of responses were 
non-substantive. All models were, therefore, estimated using Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) implemented in Amos 4.0 (Wothke 1998). 
 
VARIABLES AND MEASURES 
The variables used in these models fall under four broad categories: left-right core value; vote 
choice; party popularity; and control variables. These are described in detail below. 
 
Left-right core value: The British Election Panel Study contains a six item scale designed to 
measure ‘left-right’ (also referred to as ‘socialist/laissez-faire’) core economic values 
developed by Heath and Evans (Heath, Evans and Martin 1993; Evans and Heath 1995). The 
six items are all asked in an ‘agree-disagree’ format with five response categories and a ‘don’t 
know’ option. The subject matter of the items covers collectivism v individualism; 
government intervention v free enterprise; and economic and political equality. To control for 
response sets some of the items were reverse coded in the questionnaire. For the analysis, 
then, all items were recoded so that ‘strongly agree’ (5) always indicates a right wing 
response and ‘strongly disagree’ (1) a left wing response. The exact wordings of the six items 
are provided in the Appendix. 
Vote choice: In the 1992 and 1997 waves respondents were asked which party they had voted 
for in the most recent General Election. In the intervening waves they were asked who they 
would have voted for had there been a recent General Election. These variables were used to 
form six dummy variables indicating the individual’s pattern of party support between the 
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General Election in 1992 and the 1994 waves of the panel. Three variables indicated 
unchanging support for each of the three main parties and three indicated switching from a) 
Conservative to Labour b) Conservative to Liberal Democrat c) Labour to Liberal Democrat. 
Variables indicating switching in other directions between parties were not included in the 
analysis as the sample sizes of these categories were too small to be of analytical utility. Full 
question wordings are provided in the Appendix. 
Party popularity: The popularity of the two main parties in both 1992 and 1997 was measured 
using a five point scale ranging from (1) Strongly in Favour to (5) Strongly Against. 
Respondents were asked to “choose a phrase from this scale to say how you feel about the 
Labour/Conservative party”. These variables were retained in their raw form, the 1992 
variables employed as controls on 1997 popularity and those from 1997 as dependent 
variables of value change between 1992 and 1996. 
Control Variables: The primary aim of the analysis was to investigate the impact of variations 
in party support on changes in core political values and how such change, in turn, impacts on 
party popularity in the short to medium term. In order to be confident that any relationships 
observed between these key constructs were not attributable to other factors, a number of 
theoretically important control variables were specified in the model. Change in core 
economic values controlled for age, sex, education, social class, region, party support (all 
measured in 1992) and retrospective evaluations of personal financial circumstances and 
performance of the economy between 1992 and 1993 (measured in 1993). Change in party 
popularity in 1997 controlled for all these variables but also for party popularity in 1992 and 
pattern of party support between 1992 and 1994. 
 
RESULTS 
I begin by comparing the mean scores on a summed version of the six item left-right scale by 
main party support at the 1992 General Election (Table 1). As the key hypothesis being 
evaluated in this analysis is that parties are able to shape core political values in the short to 
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medium term, it seems sensible to establish that the value in question (and our measure of it 
in the data) is a dimension on which the parties are clearly distinct. As we might expect, there 
are substantial differences between supporters of the three main parties on this value 
dimension, with Conservative voters furthest to the right and Labour voters furthest to the 
left. All differences are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first model to be fitted, represented as a path diagram in Figure 2, is a state-trait 
longitudinal common factor model, with the state factors (U1-U6) indicating a method or 
uniqueness factor and the common factors (left-right 92 – left-right 97) representing True 
Score measures of the left-right value at each time point (see Sturgis (2002) for a detailed 
discussion of this model). The state-trait model is used to determine the level of aggregate 
stability in left-right values and to examine the pattern of factor means between 1992 and 
1997.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Estimates of the parameters of interest from this model are presented in Table 2. Looking first 
at the implied factor means, we can see that there was little movement in aggregate 
preferences on this value dimension during the period in question. There is some indication 
of a small rightward drift between 1992 and 19963 but this is followed by a move back to a 
position slightly to the left of the 1992 starting position by the time of the General Election in 
1997. Although the magnitude of these changes appears small, they are nevertheless all 
significant at the 95% level of confidence or below4. While the exact fit of the model indicates 
                                                 
3 Higher scores indicate right wing positions on the latent factors in these models. 
4 Difference tests were performed by constraining factor means to equality and subtracting the likelihood ratio of this 
model from a model without this constraint. This statistic is distributed as Chi square with degrees of freedom 
calculated as the difference in degrees of freedom between the two models (Bollen 1989). 
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a highly significant discrepancy between implied and observed variance/covariance matrices 
(Chi Square = 309; df = 115; p = 0.000), this is to be expected with this size of sample and this 
many over-identifying constraints (Maruyama 1998). Conventional adjusted measures of 
global fit (RMSEA = 0.035; CFI = .97) indicate that the model provides a good representation 
of the observed data (Hu and Bentler 1999)5. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The picture of aggregate stability on this dimension in mean structures is supported by the 
high correlations between factors over time. As we would expect the lowest correlation, 0.8, is 
between the 1992 and 1997 waves of measurement, while the highest is that between 1996 and 
1997 at 0.96. So, while there is near perfect stability over a one year period, we are still able to 
account for around two thirds of the variance in left-right value position from knowledge of 
where individual voters stood on the same dimension five years previously. Aggregate 
stability, however, cannot be simply extrapolated to what is happening at the micro level. The 
fact that correlations between factors are less than unity means that individuals are changing 
positions on this dimension and that some are changing more than others (Steyer and 
Krambeer 2003). To investigate the nature and extent of intra-individual change on this 
dimension, I re-specify the model in Figure 1 such that the latent factors in 1996 and 1997 
represent individual change from the 1992 position – the so-called baseline TIC model. Figure 
3 provides a simplified schematic representation of the full TIC model6.  
 
 
                                                 
5 There is an ongoing debate amongst practitioners of SEM concerning the relative merits of measures of ‘exact’ and 
‘close’ model fit. I do not attempt to resolve these issues here but present both varieties and leave readers to judge the 
adequacy of the models themselves. 
6 For the sake of explanatory simplicity Figure 3 presents a simplified, schematic representation of the full model, 
omitting many variables and parameters that were actually included in the estimated model. For instance, it was 
necessary to include covariance paths between the variables indicating pattern of party support but these are not 
shown as they make it difficult to discern the variables and parameters of real analytical interest. For the same reason, 
Figure 3 shows neither the control variables described on pages 14-15, nor the state factors (U1-U6) shown in Figure 
2. Contact the author for all output relating to the full model. 
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
As with the state-trait model, an exact fit test indicates a reliable discrepancy between 
implied and observed variance/covariance matrices (Chi Square = 3163; df = 899; p = 0.000),  
while adjusted measures indicate that the theoretical model fits the data well (RMSEA = 
0.039; CFI = .96). The variances of the two latent change variables from the baseline TIC 
model are 0.06 and 0.08 for the 1992-1996 and 1992-1997 periods respectively. Both are 
significant at the 99% level of confidence, indicating that there were real inter-individual 
differences in intra-individual change on the left-right value dimension during this period 
(Steyer and Krambeer 2003). Having established that true change is present, we can move to a 
consideration of its causes and consequences.  
Table 3 shows the main estimates of interest in this regard from the baseline TIC 
model. Those individuals who switched from the Conservative to the Labour party between 
1992 and 1994 became significantly more left wing in 1996 than they had been in 1992. This 
effect was not short-lived, with switchers soon returning to the ‘ideological fold’, as they 
remained significantly more left wing by the time of the General Election in 1997 than they 
had been in 1992. Those who switched from the Conservatives to the Liberal Democrats also 
exhibited a significant leftward drift in their core economic values between 1992 and 1996. 
However, by 1997, the value positions of this group were not significantly different from 
what they had been in 1992. This lends some support to the idea that, for many voters, 
switching to the Liberal Democrats from one of the other main parties represents more of a 
short-term protest than any sort of political or ideological conversion (Heath, Jowell and 
Curtice 1985). The number of voters switching from Labour to Conservative was too small to 
provide reliable estimates of value change  amongst this population  sub-group. The evidence 
from this analysis, then, supports hypothesis H1, although not for all patterns of switching 
between parties; only those switching from Conservative to Labour and Conservative to the 
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Liberal Democrats exhibited subsequent change in left-right values and, only in the former 
group did this value change persist until the 1997 election. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Looking next at the stable supporters of each of the three main parties between 1992 
and 1994, we see that only those who stayed loyal to the Conservative party during this 
period showed any change in left-right values. Between 1992 and 1996, stable Conservative 
voters moved to the right on economic issues, although this estimate falls just outside the 
conventional 95% confidence level. Between 1992 and 1997, however, the effect size is of 
comparable magnitude and significant at the 95% level, so it is probably safe to conclude that 
this effect is not a result of sampling variation. Stable supporters of the Labour and Liberal 
Democrat parties showed no reliable change in left-right values during this period. This 
pattern of results would seem to suggest that hypothesis H1 is possibly over-restrictive, as it 
shows that sticking with a party in a changing political climate can engender equivalent 
ideological change to that found amongst party switchers. 
Also included in Table 3 are the coefficients for the paths between ‘sociotropic’ and 
‘pocket-book’ retrospective economic perceptions in 1993 and the two value change variables. 
These were included in the model as control variables more than from substantive interest. 
However, it is interesting to note, in the context of the ongoing debate over the importance of 
‘economic voting’ (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier; Sanders, Ward and Marsh 1991; Sanders 1993; 
Sanders and Price 1994; Evans and Anderson 2001) that retrospective perceptions of the 
performance of the economy are significant predictors of core economic value change. 
Specifically, in 1993 the more the economy was seen to have deteriorated since the election in 
1992, the more respondents were likely to have moved to the left economically between 1992 
and 1996/7. This indicates that perceptions of the performance of the macro-economy are 
likely to have indirect as well as direct effects on party popularity and vote choice. 
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Individuals’ perceptions of changes in their own economic circumstances during this period, 
however, had no impact on left-right values. 
 Turning finally to a consideration of the consequences of change in this core political 
value, Table 3 shows that hypothesis H2 is strongly supported: core value change between 
1992 and 1996 was a strong and highly significant predictor of party popularity in 1997, even 
controlling for popularity ratings, party support, age, sex, education, social class and region 
measured in 1992 and retrospective economic perceptions measured in 1993. Specifically, the 
model estimates that a one unit change on the ‘left-right’ value dimension leads to a three to 
four unit change in the popularity ratings of the two main parties. The scale of the left-right 
latent variable is taken from the first item in the scale and, therefore, ranges from 1-5. The 
same range applies to the popularity variable, with 1 indicating ‘strongly in favour’ and 5 
indicating ‘strongly against’.  We saw from Table 2 that  the mean change on the left-right 
value dimension was only 0.06 between 1992 and 1996 and 0.13 between 1992 and 1997. 
Clearly, then, most individuals are some way from a whole unit change on the left-right value 
over this time period and this should be borne in mind when evaluating the extent to which 
value change can account for short-term volatility in party popularity.  
The model can also be used to estimate the extent to which switching from the 
Conservative to the Labour party between 1992 and 1994 impacted on party popularity 
ratings in 1997, through its effect on left-right values; switching parties in this way was 
associated with a 0.28 unit shift to the left between 1992 and 1996, a change which itself 
yielded a 0.88 unit increase in popularity rating of the Labour party and a 1.1 unit decrease in 
the equivalent rating of the Conservative party. Thus, the indirect effect of switching from the 
Conservative to the Labour party during this period on party popularity in 1997 would have 
been sufficient on its own to significantly alter ratings of party favourability at the individual 
level through its direct effect on left-right values. 
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DISCUSSION 
Conventional spatial models of party competition see voter preferences on 
ideological dimensions as fixed, with parties competing to converge on the ‘median’ voter. 
The separate tradition of research on the nature and significance of core values has, similarly, 
characterised these constructs as highly stable evaluative tendencies developed early in the 
life course, which serve to lend order and structure to more proximal and less resistant 
political preferences. The result of this view of core values as fixed or highly stable has been 
an under-emphasis in electoral research on the causes and consequences of change in core 
values in the short to medium term.  
Several writers, including Downs himself, have however recognised that assuming 
constant preferences on these dimensions is an unrealistic constraint and have proposed a 
number of mechanisms and strategies through which parties can seek to shape as well as 
respond to voter preferences on these core values and beliefs. Mostly, the emphasis here has 
been on strategies which seek to change the social-structural composition of the electorate 
(Dunleavy 1980a; Dunleavy 1980b; Dunleavy and Ward 1981; Dunleavy 1991), though the 
case for more communication-based, social psychological mechanisms has also gained a 
degree of theoretical and empirical support (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985; McCann 1997). 
In this paper I used a True Intra-individual Change (TIC) structural equation model 
fitted to data from the 1992-1997 British Election Panel Survey to demonstrate that patterns of 
stability and change in party allegiance significantly altered voter preferences in the short to 
medium term on the left-right core economic value. Furthermore, such change was a strong 
and highly significant predictor of subsequent ratings of party popularity. The model 
employed corrected for measurement error in the observed indicators of the ‘left-right’ value 
and constrained the pattern of factor loadings to be invariant over time, removing uncertainty 
concerning the invariance of the meaning of these items during the period in question. 
Voters who switched allegiance from the Conservative to the Labour party between 
1992 and 1994 showed a significant shift to the left between 1992 and 1997. Those switching 
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from the Conservatives to the Liberal Democrats exhibited a left-ward drift between 1992 and 
1996 but had returned to their 1992 positions by the time of the General Election in 1997. 
Movement between parties in other directions was either associated with no significant value 
change or sample sizes were too small to estimate a reliable effect. Of those with a stable 
party allegiance, only consistent supporters of the Conservative party showed any change in 
core values, moving significantly to the right between 1992 and 1997.  
The magnitude of the short-term effect of party allegiance on  core values is not, on 
this evidence, large. The greatest change in left-right value in this analysis was found 
amongst those switching support from the Conservative to the Labour party between 1992 
and 1994. The unstandardised coefficient for this parameter was just 0.28, indicating a quarter 
unit move to the right on the underlying latent construct as a result of this change of 
allegiance. However, it is important, when judging the substantive as opposed to the 
statistical significance of these findings, to bear in mind that the left-right value dimension is 
itself an extremely powerful predictor of vote choice (Bartle 1998; Evans and Anderson 2001). 
This quarter unit change in left right value was sufficient to engender a full unit decrease in 
the popularity of the Conservative party in 1997, net of other factors. 
The theoretical mechanisms through which this value change was argued to operate 
are based on social psychological theories of cognitive consistency (Heider 1944; Heider 1946; 
Festinger 1957; Bem 1972) and social identity (Tajfel 1981; Turner et al. 1987; Turner 1991). As 
individuals change their party of allegiance, or have their existing allegiance made salient, 
they will be motivated to minimize inconsistency between their own core values and those 
articulated by their party of allegiance. Hence, the focus of attention here is not so much on 
factors such as leadership, personality, media framing and campaign strategy which 
precipitate vote choice (see Kinder and Sears (1985) for a review) but on the social 
psychological mechanisms of internal attitude change which follow on the heels of such 
factors. 
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The pattern of value stability and change across different paths of party allegiance 
observed here lends support to these mechanisms as drivers of core value change. The group 
of voters whose preferences changed most during the period under study were those who 
had supported the Conservative party at the 1992 General Election. Those switching to the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties from the Conservatives would clearly be subject to such 
pressures as they moved to parties with historically very different core values and beliefs. 
Those staying with the Conservative party during this period would, similarly, have had 
their party identities made very salient as poll ratings plunged and the government lurched 
from one crisis to another. Only what we might consider ‘committed Conservatives’ stayed 
with the party during this period and this commitment would have been highly apparent to 
individual voters as they observed the sudden rise in popular support for the New Labour 
project. 
True, a competing hypothesis is not discounted by the evidence presented here. It 
may be the case that value change had already begun, engendered perhaps by changing 
economic circumstances, prior to the 1992 survey and that vote change occurred as a 
consequence rather than a cause of value change. By this logic, had the 1992 election not 
occurred, we would still have seen the same pattern of ideological stability and change. While 
the data do not allow a test of this hypothesis, this should not necessarily be seen as a 
competing but, rather, a complementary account of the relationship between core value 
change and party support. We saw from the TIC model that patterns of party support 
between 1992 and 1994 impacted on left-right values between 1992 and 1996 and that this had 
a concomitant impact on party popularity in 1997. The picture this presents then is not one in 
which causality flows in just one direction but a complex, reciprocal relationship between 
party allegiance and value change, with parties both shaping and being shaped by the 
evolving value constellation of the polity over time. 
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Figure 2 Simplified Path Diagram of State-Trait Model 
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Figure 3 Simplified Path Diagram of Baseline TIC Model 
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TABLE 1 MEANS ON LEFT-RIGHT SUMMED SCALE BY PARTY (1992) 
  mean n 
Conservative 16.5 627 
Labour 22.9 490 
Liberal Democrat 20.7 269 
 
TABLE 2 MEANS & CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LEFT-RIGHT POSITIONS 92-97 
  1992 1996 1997 
mean 3.47 3.53 3.34 
1992 1   
1996 0.84 1  
1997 0.8 0.96 1 
 
TABLE 3 KEY ESTIMATES FROM TIC BASELINE MODEL 
Dependent Variable Predictor b s.e.  p value Beta 
Value Change 92-96 switched Con-Lab 92-94 0.28 0.042 0.000 0.30 
Value Change 92-97 switched Con-Lab 92-94 0.14 0.045 0.002 0.12 
Value Change 92-96 switched Con-Lib 92-94 0.15 0.039 0.003 0.17 
Value Change 92-97 switched Con-Lib 92-94 0.07 0.042 0.082 0.07 
Value Change 92-96 switched Lab-Lib 92-94 0.01 0.076 0.857 0.01 
Value Change 92-97 switched Lab-Lib 92-94 0.01 0.084 0.864 0.01 
Value Change 92-96 stayed Con 92-94 -0.07 0.034 0.052 -0.11 
Value Change 92-97 stayed Con 92-94 -0.12 0.039 0.002 -0.16 
Value Change 92-96 stayed Lab 92-94 -0.04 0.036 0.259 -0.04 
Value Change 92-97 stayed Lab 92-94 -0.03 0.055 0.589 -0.07 
Value Change 92-96 stayed Lib 92-94 -0.04 0.050 0.462 -0.05 
Value Change 92-97 stayed Lib 92-94 0.02 0.050 0.721 0.02 
Value Change 92-96 pocket-book retro 93 0.01 0.014 0.711 0.03 
Value Change 92-97 pocket-book retro 93 -0.03 0.014 0.079 -0.07 
Value Change 92-96 sociotropic retro 93 0.04 0.015 0.012 0.13 
Value Change 92-97 sociotropic retro 93 0.05 0.015 0.001 0.14 
Labour Popularity 97 Value Change 92-96 -3.14 0.469 0.000 -0.74 
Conservative Popularity 97 Value Change 92-96 3.77 0.553 0.000 0.74 
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APPENDIX 
Question Wordings for Heath et al. (1993) ‘Left-Right’ Value Scale 
 
1. Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth.  
2. There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.  
3. Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems. 
4. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership. 
5. It is government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one. 
6. There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employee’s working conditions  and 
wages. 
Response categories ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Items 1, 3 and 6 
were reverse coded for the analysis. 
 
Question wordings and coding for Vote Choice Variables 
In the 1992 wave of the survey, respondents were asked, “Which party did you vote for in the 
general election?” 
In 1994, respondents were asked, “If there had been a general election on the 9th of June, 
which political party do you think you would have been most likely to have voted for, or do 
you think you would not have voted?” 
 
 
From these two questions dummy variables were created to indicate: stable Conservatives,  
stable Labour, stable Liberal Democrats, switchers from Conservative to Labour,  switchers 
from Conservative to Liberal Democrat and switchers from Labour to Liberal Democrat. 
 
 
Question wordings for Party Popularity Variables 
 
In 1992 and 1997 respondents were asked the following question: 
 
Please choose a phrase from this card to say how you feel about … 
 
The Conservative Party, The Labour Party, The Liberal Democrat Party. 
 
Response categories ranged from: strongly in favour (1) to strongly against (5)  
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Control Variables 
 
Change in left-right value between 1992 and 1996 and 1992 and 1997 controlled for a range of 
stable respondent characteristics measured in the 1992 wave of the panel. These are described 
below: 
 
Social Class: five dummy variables were computed from the six category version of the 
Goldthorpe social class variable (Goldthorpe 1997). 
Education: six dummy variables were created from the seven category variable measuring 
highest educational qualification. 
Region: six dummy variables were created to indicate whether the respondent’s region of 
residence was in the North, the Midlands, the South (including London), Wales, Scotland or 
Northern Ireland. 
Age: age in years was included as a continuous variable. 
Sex: a dummy variable for sex was included with 1 = male. 
 
 
In 1993 respondents were asked two questions relating to economic circumstances. These 
were used as controls on change in left-right value between 1992 and 1996 and on party 
popularity ratings in 1997: 
 
• Since the last general election in June 1992, would you say that your own standard of 
living has increased or fallen? 
 
• Since the last general election in June 1992, would you say that the general standard 
of living has increased or fallen? 
 
Response categories ranged from ‘gone up a lot’ (1) to ‘gone down a lot’ (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
